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3Introduction
Situated at the Eastern tip of the Commonwealth’s Middle Peninsula, Mathews County, 
Virginia, is a historic and charming rural community nestled against the Chesapeake Bay. 
But the same waters that sustain life in Mathews County threaten its continued existence. 
As sea levels rise and recurrent coastal flooding razes Virginia’s Middle Peninsula, too many 
citizens of Mathews can only watch as their homes and land slip slowly into the Bay. In 
order to preserve the beauty and safety of the community for current residents and future 
generations, Mathews County must look to developing strategies and tools to combat 
this threat.  This paper adapts the transfer of development rights (TDR) concept – a 
community-planning tool most frequently used for farmland preservation – to alleviate 
the financial burdens that recurrent flooding and sea level rise impose on Mathews County 
and its citizens. 
A TDR program diverts development from a designated area of a community where 
the locality seeks preservation or reduced growth towards another designated area of the 
community where it seeks more growth.1  The fundamental TDR process is as follows:
1. The community identifies an area in which it does not want further development, 
referred to as a “sending” area.
2. The community identifies an area for added development, referred to as a “receiving” 
area. The community seeks further growth in this location.
3. Sending area property owners or TDR partners elect, if compensated, to sever their 
rights to develop their property, placing a permanent easement on the land.
4. Meanwhile, developers can pay extra for additional development rights in receiving 
areas. 
5. This extra fee, paid by developers, is passed to the sending area property owners as 
compensation for voluntarily relinquishing their development rights.
In summary, developers pay for an added development bonus with the payment 
serving as compensation to the sending area property owner for foregoing development 
and agreeing to preserve his property (most frequently in perpetuity).  
Few, if any, existing programs are designed to encourage sustainable development 
away from areas vulnerable to sea level rise and recurrent coastal flooding. Burdened by 
economic and political challenges, TDR programs are, as discussed below, inconsistent in 
accomplishing the land use objectives of the implementing community. This paper explores 
the history of TDRs in Virginia, summarizes existing research on TDR effectiveness, 
describes the challenges in Mathews, and proposes TDR models as land-use tools for 
sustainable development in Virginia’s Middle Peninsula.
A History of Transfer of Development Rights in Virginia
The Virginia General Assembly adopted enabling legislation for TDRs in 2006.2  After 
its adoption, the General Assembly amended the TDR law to allow for transfers across 
county-city lines and to remove a requirement that the transferred or severed rights from 
the sending area be immediately attached to another property after severance.3  In 2010, 
a group of stakeholder representatives consisting of lawyers, planners, developers, and 
4others, created a model ordinance.4   Although many localities within the Commonwealth 
explored creating TDR programs, currently, only Frederick, Stafford, and Arlington 
counties utilize a TDR program.
Purchase of development rights programs (PDR) are more common in Virginia, with 
21 participating local governments across the state.5  Within a designated area, PDRs 
provide governmental compensation to landowners while restricting development on their 
land.6  In return for compensation, participating landowners place an easement on their 
land.7   
Virginia Beach’s PDR program is one of the most successful in the Commonwealth, 
preserving over 9,265 acres as of 2015.8  Adopted in 19959, the City of Virginia Beach’s 
PDR program arose out of necessity.  In the 1980s and 1990s Virginia Beach experienced 
unprecedented growth, resulting in land scarcity.  Residential development steadily 
encroached upon the city’s greenline, the geographic boundary between the urban/
suburban and rural regions of the city.  This was problematic because the city’s rural areas 
accounted for roughly one third of the local economy.10  Virginia Beach determined that 
extending infrastructure into the rural areas would be very expensive and cause significant 
harm to the city’s economy and culture.11  Additionally, rural landowners faced substantial 
costs and expenses that threatened forced sales of their property.  Inheritance taxes on an 
inherited farm, for example, could sometimes be so large that selling the land was the only 
option.  Virginia Beach’s PDR program enabled landowners to retain ownership of their 
land by providing cash through the purchase of the development rights attached to their 
property.   
Virginia Beach's population generally supported establishing a PDR program. A TDR 
program was also proposed during this same time period, but it did not garner the same 
level of public support.  Thus, the city moved forward with a plan to develop a TDR 
program and abandoned the TDR alternative. 
Frederick County adopted a TDR ordinance in 2010 to preserve the county’s farmland 
and rural areas.13  Located in the northwest part of the Commonwealth, Frederick County 
encompasses the city of Winchester and is mostly rural.14  Frederick County designed its 
TDR program to simultaneously accomplish two goals in addition to famland preservation: 
increase development opportunities in Urban Development Areas (UDAs) and benefit the 
Pruetz and Standridge argue that at the time Virginia Beach adopted its PDR program the 
city was a fundamentally conservative community.12  They share their conclusion that 
many citizens viewed a TDR program as government interference with private property 
rights and the private market.  Even though TDRs are often transacted through the private 
marketplace, the local government serves as a third party to the transaction by enabling 
the program, determining the sending and receiving areas, and establishing the zoning 
law framework.  Interestingly, a PDR program arguably involves more government 
entanglement with private property rights than TDRs:  With TDRs, the government is 
merely a party enabling the private market transaction while with PDRs the government 
is the marketplace.  Moreover, funding for PDRs, as in Virginia Beach, is often obtained 
through real estate tax levies on all landowners whereas funding for TDRs is obtained 
through a transaction involving a willing buyer and seller.  It is interesting that Virginia 
Beach opted for a taxing tool to provide economic recovery for landowners and resisted 
use of the supply and demand of the market alternative.  
Property 
Rights and 
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5county overall.  During the inception of the TDR program, the county found that 30% 
of all new housing development occurred in the rural areas of the county.14  Having a 
significant portion of residential development in rural areas creates challenges for localities 
because rural areas lack the same level of infrastructure present in urban and suburban 
communities.  More residential construction in rural areas places a heavier burden on local 
governments to provide additional schools, transportation, and public water and sewer, 
among other services.
Frederick County’s TDR program proposes to preserve farmland and alleviate financial 
burdens on landowners. Frederick County’s TDR program grants residential density rights 
to qualified landowners, which can then be severed from the land and sold to developers on 
the open market.  The goal is for the landowners to remain solvent and retain ownership of 
their land.  Frederick County subdivides its sending area into three categories determined 
by land attributes.15 The county then assigns different density bonuses to each of these 
categories.15
Because a TDR program's success depends on demand for bonus development in the 
receiving areas,16 Frederick County’s TDR program designed its program to be attractive 
to developers.  As with most TDR programs, when developers purchase rights they gain 
increased development density in a residential development project within a receiving 
area.  An increase in residential densities means an increase in units available for sale and 
consequently an increase in the property’s market value.  In addition, gaining additional 
density rights through participation in a TDR program is often designed to work faster 
than a traditional rezoning for increased density.  
Frederick County has completed only one severance and transfer of a development 
right: a private transfer where the owner of the land in the sending area was the same 
individual who owned the land in the receiving area.  Essentially, the individual transferred 
development rights from himself to himself.  Additionally, though the county approved 
several farms to transfer their rights, no developers to date have sought to purchase these 
rights. According to the county’s senior planner, the lack of demand for bonus density is 
primarily due to a stagnant economy and stymied residential development in general in 
the county.18  
The current results of Frederick County’s TDR program provide an example of how 
the market can dramatically influence the success of a program, regardless of whether a 
locality has done all it can to enable the TDR process.  It is the hope of Frederick County 
that eventually the market will rebound.
Frederick County derives significant benefits from a TDR program.  The TDR plan 
is designed to increase growth in specified urban areas of the county, the Urban 
Development Areas (UDAs).  When residential development increases, so does the 
county's tax base.  However, developers of homes in the rural areas of the county do 
not pay proffers or provide transportation improvements.  The county must fund these 
expenses, making residential development in rural areas more costly to the county.  UDAs 
can accommodate a higher density and more residential growth than rural areas.  When 
residential density increases within the UDA, and development shifts from rural areas to 
urban areas, the additional cost of services decreases, which alleviates financial stress on 
local government.  TDR Program in Frederick County, note 13.17
TDR 
Economic 
Benefits
6TDR Success Factors
Rick Pruetz and Noah Standridge’s article, “What makes TDRs work? Success Factors 
From Research and Practice”19  is a useful framing document for localities desiring to 
implement or improve upon a TDR program.  The authors analyzed the 20 most successful 
TDR programs nationwide, in terms of land area preserved, and identified 10 TDR 
success factors in those individual programs. The authors ranked the factors by frequency 
of occurrence:
1. Demand for bonus development
2. Customized receiving areas
3. Strict sending-area regulations
4. Few alternatives to TDR
5. Market incentives
6. Certainty of TDR use
7. Strong public preservation support
8. Simplicity
9. Promotion and facilitation
10. TDR bank
Pruetz and Standridge assert that program success depends on the existence of at least one 
of the following factors:
• Strict sending-area regulations
• Market incentives
• Few alternatives to TDR
They note that demand for bonus development and customized receiving areas is also a 
critical factor for success.
According to Pruetz and Standridge, the three most successful programs, as of 2008, 
are King County, WA; New Jersey Pinelands, NJ; and Montgomery County, MD.  All 
three TDR programs exhibit three of these four factors (demand for bonus development, 
customized receiving areas, and strict sending regulations.) New Jersey Pinelands and 
Montgomery County also display a fourth factor, few alternatives to TDR.
Demand for bonus development is the highest-ranking factor for successful TDR 
programs.  As reflected in the Frederick County summary, for a TDR program to work, 
developers must actually want the rights the landowners are willing to transfer.  Locality 
stimulation of demand for TDRs is not a simple action.  Although downzoning can assist 
in increasing demand for bonus density, downzoning is sometimes politically unpopular. 
Because of the potential local distaste for downzoning and the threat of lawsuits, localities 
may be hesitant to embrace this option.  An alternative, potentially less-polarizing option, 
is to connect the transfer with a benefit or a perk other than increased density.  For 
example, localities could allow bonus floor area, or exemptions from road improvement 
requirements, or expedited building permit processes.20  This paper discusses this concept 
in later sections. 
7Tailored receiving areas are a second critical factor for success.  Successful TDR 
programs customize their receiving areas to their individual communities.  Context is key 
and necessitates a “boots on the ground” approach.  Community stakeholders must buy 
into the TDR program, so the areas of the community receiving additional density should 
target the locality’s development goals.  Citizens might resist such a proposal due to a 
“Not in My Backyard” attitude.  Pruetz and Standridge suggest creating new receiving 
areas in previously undeveloped areas, thereby separating new development from existing 
communities, to mitigate this type of resistance.21   
For most communities implementing a TDR program, the ideal transfer is from 
rural areas to cities with greater infrastructure and resources.  Some counties experienced 
success with interjurisdictional transfers.  Boulder, Colorado signed intergovernmental 
agreements to facilitate transfers of development rights between the county and six cities 
and three unincorporated communities in close proximity to Boulder.22   
Transfers not only rely on demand for density and customized receiving areas, but 
also on the supply of TDRs flowing into the market.  Strict sending-area development 
regulations inherently increase the supply of TDRs.23  Several problems arise when a 
locality fails to strictly regulate its sending areas. Without strict sending area regulations, 
the development value of the property may exceed the value of the transferable development 
rights. As a result, the property owner can either charge more for the right (which could 
deter developers) or simply develop the property (against the goals of the TDR program). 
In either scenario, demand for TDRs decreases.  
To combat this type of resultant market failure, Montgomery County downzoned 
their sending areas from one unit per five acres to one unit per twenty-five acres.24  By 
downzoning, Montgomery County increased demand for TDRs amongst the development 
community. Montgomery County’s TDR program is now among the most successful 
TDR programs in the nation.25  But downzoning sending areas, much like downzoning 
receiving areas, can incite political backlash,26  depending on the political climate of 
the locality.  Many opponents to such a downzoning may assert that it is a form of a 
government taking under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.27
Why do TDR Programs Fail?
Localities nationwide have implemented TDR programs, with varying degrees of success. 
Most of these programs were directed at agricultural area preservation rather than 
environmentally sustainable development. Nonetheless, existing TDR schemes, including 
those that are underperforming or failing entirely, offer insight into how to construct a 
successful TDR program. While certain design principles predispose a TDR program 
to success or failure, any successful TDR program must be specifically designed for its 
local market so as to ensure an optimal supply and demand ratio.28  A suboptimal ratio of 
supply and demand incentives within a particular locality can make-or-break a program. 
Supply
If a locality fails to offer a sustainable “supply” of development rights, it stunts the 
transfer process. While analysts conclude that in general, there are fewer problems 
optimizing the “supply” side,29  most of the TDR programs analyzed were programs 
implemented to preserve agricultural land, not already-developed properties facing 
coastal flooding and sea-level rise effects.
8In some failed TDR programs, the zoning of the sending area undercuts the 
landowner’s incentive to exchange the development rights. For example, in sending 
areas with a high baseline density, a parcel of land typically has a somewhat elevated 
development value.30  According to the available research, a landowner, aware of this 
value, is incentivized to retain his development rights, develop the land, and realize that 
value. In aggregate, a “sending” area would have little to send, and the TDR program 
would be anemic. In fact, baseline density does not even need to be excessively high 
for the market to simply sidestep an available TDR program. If zoning density in 
the sending area merely satisfies (rather than exceeds) market demand, there is little 
value added by a TDR program that offers bonus density elsewhere. Comprehensive 
downzoning in a sending area would stimulate a “supply” of transfers by devaluing 
the retention of these rights, but such a comprehensive downzoning commitment has 
intimidated some localities.
TDR programs are also prone to fail when there is either burden or uncertainty 
inherent in the transaction.31 Because active managerial oversight is similarly 
important to a program’s maintenance and success, localities must take particular care 
that this oversight does not burden the process of transfer so as to deter participation. 
In some jurisdictions, for example, TDR use is not “by right,” and instead requires 
the approval of local government at some point in the process.32  The introduction 
of some discretionary local-government approval process adds an element of risk 
to investment in the transaction, which in turn can cause participants to flinch. 
A streamlined, “by right” TDR process minimizes the actual or perceived risks of 
the transaction and encourages participation. Local government may stimulate the 
transaction by aggregating and disseminating information to potential participants, 
establishing a TDR “bank” to mediate the transaction, or even entering the market 
to stabilize prices; but to reduce the risk that deters investors, localities must accept a 
reduced amount of control over individual land uses.33
Demand
Optimizing the “demand” side – the receiving areas and those seeking to develop 
within them – is trickier. For the TDR market to thrive and accomplish the locality’s 
policy goals, demand for development in receiving areas must match or exceed the 
supply of “exported” development rights from sending areas. Several factors, however, 
diminish this demand.
TDR programs fail when there are sufficient alternatives to participation in 
the TDR market. If there are other avenues to receive a density bonus in a desired 
development area without using the TDR program, demand for the TDR is thereby 
reduced. In some jurisdictions, TDRs are only one of several ways a developer can 
secure a desired density bonus.34 These available workarounds dilute the incentive to 
enter the TDR market to achieve the desired result.
Similarly, TDR programs fail when an alternative to the TDR market is 
nonparticipation. If the existing a density levels in the receiving areas satisfy the 
market, developers have no need to secure any additional development rights, and 
therefore no need to enter the TDR market. As discussed above, creative and strategic 
zoning decisions can stimulate or facilitate demand, but cannot create it entirely; 
developers must want to develop in a receiving area from the outset.
9Just as burdensome government oversight can discourage property owners from 
severing their development rights, cumbersome restrictions and requirements for 
eligible developers can discourage participation in the program. Developers will likely 
be wary of the added transaction costs associated with a clunky, overregulated, or 
inefficient TDR process.
TDR Failure Factors
Supply (Transferring Owners in 
Flood-prone Communities)
Demand (Receiving Area Developers) 
In sending area, Development Value ≥ 
Transfer Value
Alternatives to acquire desired density 
without TDR
Burdensome process deters participation  Existing zoning density satisfies market
Discretionary government approval adds 
uncertainty, risk
Developers disinterested in receiving area
Burdensome oversight deters participation
Discretionary government approval adds 
uncertainty, risk; development is not “by 
right”
Making a TDR Work in the Middle Peninsula and Mathews 
County
A successful TDR program in Mathews County, part of Virginia’s Middle Peninsula, 
must be designed for the Mathews County market. In general, a locality must incorporate 
their TDR design into their growth strategies and reconcile a new system of development 
incentives with the locality’s long-term interests.  Additionally, a locality must apply the 
factors for TDR success and failure, identified above, when crafting the balance of supply 
and demand incentives for effective TDRs. In the Middle Peninsula, demographic and 
economic pressures implicate specific challenges and opportunities in balancing supply 
and demand. 
Residents of the Middle Peninsula overwhelmingly travel out of the area for work.35 
The top 3 destinations of these out-commuters are nearby Newport News, Henrico 
County, and Richmond.36 If these residents’ properties are reclaimed by sea-level rise, 
or razed by recurrent flooding, there may exist a strong incentive for these residents to 
resettle outside of the Middle Peninsula and nearer to their places of employment. Any 
TDR program in Mathews County, therefore, must be mindful of the incentive towards 
diaspora, where property owners transfer their development rights, accept the perks of 
the program, and flee the county. The locality’s interest in averting redevelopment of 
threatened property may be accomplished, but at the cost of splintered communities and 
an eroding tax base. The inter-jurisdictional transfer of development rights may, for this 
reason, be a less attractive strategy if it allows for an incentive to resettle out of the area. 
In effect, Mathews County’s goals are somewhat in tension: to achieve the desired policy 
goals of relocating residents away from flood prone areas, flood-displaced residents must 
be encouraged to leave their existing properties, but not the county itself.
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TDR programs also fail when there are sufficient alternatives to participation in the 
TDR market. If there are other avenues to receive density bonus in a desired development 
area without using the TDR program, demand for the TDR is thereby reduced. In some 
jurisdictions, TDR’s are only one of several ways a developer can secure a desired density 
bonus  and these available workarounds dilute the incentive to enter the TDR market to 
achieve the desired result.
For many in Mathews County, however, shoreside living is a lifestyle choice. The 
Middle Peninsula population is aging,37 and older retirees hold many of the threatened 
waterfront properties prone to recurrent flooding. There may not be strong inclination 
for some of these residents to forsake the waterfront homes in which they have chosen to 
spend their golden years.
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   In turn, “supply” side property owners may not find sufficient compensation to 
justify relocation. Because of these localized factors, the “demand” side of the market may 
find little value in added development density. There simply may not be much value in 
transferring development density.
A successful TDR program for coastal flooding impact mitigation might therefore 
convert the transferred “development rights” into some valuable bonus other than 
density. The Middle Peninsula Planning District Commission’s April 2013 Economic 
Development Strategy documents a variety of prospective development projects in the 
Middle Peninsula.38  In essence, a successful TDR program in Mathews County or 
elsewhere the Middle Peninsula might necessitate “converting” the development right 
into some other valuable perk for developers, demand for which would sustain the TDR 
market and offer a steady stream of demand to entice supply-side homeowners.
The Economic Development Strategy identifies projects of both “strategic” and “vital” 
importance in the Middle Peninsula. The projects for private industry may be opportunities 
to entice those private developers to fund TDRs in exchange for development incentives. 
Localities like the Middle Peninsula could be endlessly creative in what incentives they 
tailor to these projects and their developers. Incentives might include tax incentives, 
streamlined licensure or permitting processes, and even favorable zoning.
Vital Projects Strategic Projects
Water supply/sewer infrastructure
Broadband infrastructure
Tappahannock Main Street revitalization
Regional tourism
Pellet plant and silviculture
Upscale retirement home
Regional tourism
Middle crossing of the York River (bridge)
Compressed natural gas filling station
Localities could align a TDR program – their environmentally-conscious land use 
interests – with their strategic and economic interests, offering development incentives 
of real value to developers in particular industries in exchange for funds that would make 
whole the transferors in flood-vulnerable communities. On this “demand” side of the 
TDR transaction, widely accepted to be the trickier side to optimize, ample room exists 
for experimentation to make the program economically viable.
Meanwhile, on the supply side, localities can capitalize on the real, measurable threat 
of recurrent flooding and sea level rise to stimulate the “supply” of rights transfers. First, 
localities bear the cost of providing emergency services to flooded areas. If the locality 
were to levy an impact fee on the areas that most require these emergency services (instead 
of raising taxes on the County at large to bear these costs) homeowners in these areas 
would be inclined to consider alternatives to continually redeveloping repeatedly damaged 
properties. Impact fees could therefore encourage sending area property owners to enter 
the TDR market and transfer their development rights. 
Second, as homeowners face the inevitable loss of their investments by rising water 
levels, a locality might be able to take advantage of the resulting urgency by structuring 
its TDR program like a corporate “tender offer.” The locality would limit participation 
to a finite amount of transfers at a set level of compensation to the transferor.  Once the 
threshold number of homeowners development rights are “tendered” by the right-holders, 
the TDR program suspends. Each owner, presumably recognizing he will inevitably lose 
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his investment, is incentivized to act immediately to offset that loss, before his similarly-
situated neighbors exercise the option and the TDR program closes.
In fact, the locality could be quite flexible in structuring the “tender offer,” tailoring 
the program to the locality’s specific strategic goals. By structuring the tender offer in tiers, 
the locality could customize the program and prolong its use if the locality is unwilling 
to close the program completely. Tenderers in the first “tier” – e.g., the first 20 property 
owners to tender – receive more attractive or more generous compensation than tenderers 
in the second tier, who will receive more or different compensation than those in the third, 
and so forth. A graduated structure would incentivize homeowners to transfer sooner, in 
competition with other threatened homeowners for increasingly scarce returns. 
The front-loaded, tiered tender offer is derived from hostile corporate takeovers; thus, 
a tiered transfer program may create the misperception of the locality coercing already-
threatened property owners instead of trying to make them whole and keeping them 
financially solvent. One way to avoid this misperception would be to assure that the 
compensation offered at each tier – and the differences between the tiers – are used to 
fairly distribute a finite amount of certain compensation benefits, or could even be tailored 
into a “sunset” provision, used to attenuate or even extinguish over time the locality’s 
involvement in the TDR program as its ends are achieved. A government program that 
naturally provides for its own extinction could also alleviate the anxieties of certain political 
constituencies that prefer minimal governmental involvement in the management of 
private property. 
Political and Cultural Considerations  
As noted earlier, a significant success element in implementation of a TDR program is 
constituent support.  This can be difficult in communities where protection of private 
property rights is a fundamental concern.  Some members of the community may view 
TDRs as a form of a “taking” or as government intervention with private property rights. 
(See, for example, the prior discussion re: Virginia Beach’s experience with proposing 
TDRs during the early 1990’s where the community reaction was one of opposition in 
part due to the perception of excessive government intervention.) 
An additional level of tension may arise when using TDRs in response to sea level 
rise and recurrent flooding.  Some minimize existence of the climate change impacts. 
For some, going under water literally may not be a potential reality to necessitate a TDR 
program. Increased education and honest, persuasive messaging – in combination with 
the documentation of the frequent flooding of streets and parking lots – can help shape 
the understanding of the need. 
Proposal A - “Traditional TDR” 
The proposal chart below sets forth a series of traditional approaches to a TDR program 
for Mathews County, the Middle Peninsula, and the Tidewater Region. These proposals 
apply the basic TDR features and components analyzed above to stimulate supply and 
demand in each scenario. Note that they vary in the following ways:
• In a traditional TDR program, sending area rights holders receive “bonus” density to 
sell to developers in the receiving areas. This difference of county-, area- and, region-
wide bonus levels aims to compensate for the varying size of the program’s “market”; 
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the higher density bonus in Mathews County attempts to incentivize resettling in-
county, in the interest of preserving the Mathews County culture, community, and 
tax base.
• The varying downzoning adjusts for the different size of the TDR market, from 
Mathews County (relatively small) to the Tidewater Region (relatively large). 
Aggressive downzoning induces developers to enter the market. The sheer difference 
in scale at the larger market should be enough to achieve a demand for rights sufficient 
to compensate the threatened property owners. 
• Deferred taxes (common to all scenarios) is chiefly meant to avoid any actual or 
perceived penalty to any receiving area developer or sending area property owner, 
while they navigate the TDR transaction. 
Traditional TDR
Mathews County Middle Peninsula Tidewater Region
Supply Impact fee (sender)
TDR bank
Defer taxes on rights 
until severance (sender)
High density bonus 
(receiver)
30 years to exercise 
(sender)
Tiered “tender offer” 
model (sender)
Impact fee (sender)
TDR bank
Defer taxes on rights 
until severance (sender)
Moderate density 
bonus (receiver)
20 years to exercise
(sender)
Tiered “tender offer” 
model (sender)
Impact fee (sender)
TDR bank
Defer taxes on rights 
until severance (sender)
Low density bonus
(receiver)
20 years to exercise
(sender)
Tiered “tender offer” 
model
Demand Aggressive downzoning Moderate downzoning Minimal downzoning
Potential 
legislative 
changes
State law
Zoning ordinance
State law 
Interjurisdictional 
agreements
Zoning ordinance
State Law
Interjurisdictional 
agreements
Zoning ordinance
Proposal B - “Nontraditional TDR”
Bonus density, used in a traditional TDR program, may not always be the solution for 
creating demand for development rights.  For some localities, such as Frederick County, 
VA, offering bonus density in exchange for rights failed to work because of the low 
general demand for residential development.  This proposal suggests an alternative to 
the traditional bonus density as a TDR feature. By providing an incentive other than 
increased residential density, a county might achieve greater success. 
One strategy is using local projects as the driver for the purchase of TDRs from 
property owners by private developers.  As previously referenced in this paper, the 
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Economic Development Strategy identifies the economic development initiatives of the 
Middle Peninsula, and leaves for elected officials the possibility to link some of these 
initiatives to a TDR program.  For example, Mathews County might offer expedited 
permit processing to a private silviculture company if it built a pellet plant in the County 
and purchased TDRs from sending area property owners.  The projects and goals set out 
in The Economic Development Strategy offer creative ways for the Middle Peninsula to 
generate the funds for achieving the goals of a TDR program.
Low-lying coastal areas like Mathews County might also consider linking the 
TDRs to wetland mitigation credits as an alternative to bonus density.  The County 
might consider brokering a transaction that “converts” the bonus densities into wetland 
mitigation credits which the County has established through conversion of the sending 
area properties upon the severing of the development rights.  Developers in need of these 
credits, either in the county or in the region, could purchase them from the county with 
all or a part of the purchase price compensating the sending property owner. As in a 
traditional TDR program, this approach preserves a landowner’s property value, while 
simultaneously accomplishing the locality’s land use goals.
Conclusion
The concept of TDRs as a vehicle for providing economic relief to properties threatened 
by sea level rise or recurrent coastal flooding while serving to move development away 
from these shoreline areas is one which could offer the Middle Peninsula and Mathews 
County a new avenue for moving forward.  This paper does not look at whether any of 
the specific proposals or creative alternatives are allowable under Virginia’s existing TDR 
enabling law. Should the concept merit detailed consideration, and one of the alternatives 
– or some other alternative – generate discussion and deliberation, the next step is to 
establish the framework for the alternative and then take steps to ensure implementation 
through necessary changes to local and/or state law.
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